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THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND
CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM
ADAM N. SCHUPACK†
ABSTRACT
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been a testing ground for the
involvement of U.S. courts in foreign conflicts and for the concept of
civil litigation against terrorists. Plaintiffs on both sides of the dispute
have sought to recover damages in U.S. courts, embroiling the courts
in one of the world’s most contentious political disputes. Plaintiffs
bringing claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
Palestinian Authority, material supporters of terrorism, and the
Islamic Republic of Iran have been aided by congressional statutes
passed precisely to enhance their ability to bring such lawsuits,
whereas plaintiffs bringing suit against Israel or Israeli leaders have
not had the benefit of such laws. Although the courts have sought to
give effect to the congressional authorization embodied in these
statutes, they have faced the resistance—at times half-hearted—of the
executive branch, which regards such legislative and judicial
involvement as an intrusion on its foreign policy prerogatives.
Though these lawsuits have been subject to criticism and have not
fully achieved the goals attributed to them, U.S. courts have largely
acted within the authority given them by Congress and the executive
branch in hearing the suits, and there is at least some evidence that
such lawsuits constitute an effective tool in the fight against terrorism.

INTRODUCTION
Alisa Flatow, a twenty-year-old Brandeis University student
studying in Israel, was killed on April 9, 1995, when Palestinian
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Islamic Jihad terrorists blew up the bus in which she was traveling in
1
the Gaza Strip. On April 18, 1996, Saadallah Ali Belhas’s wife
Zeineb and nine of their children were killed when an errant Israeli
shell hit the U.N. compound at Qana, Lebanon, where they were
sheltering from Israel’s Operation Grapes of Wrath against
2
Hezbollah fighters. What separates these victims and their families
from thousands of others who have died in the course of the ArabIsraeli conflict is that their families sought justice through private civil
litigation in the United States. Using statutes intended to combat
terrorism and human rights violations, these plaintiffs and others like
them have forced U.S. courts to confront the contentious Arab-Israeli
3
conflict.
In light of that dispute’s central role in U.S. foreign policy and
international politics, this Note takes the conflict as its starting point.
In doing so, it offers a new approach to analyzing how U.S. courts
have dealt with civil suits related to terrorism in the context of a
conflict laden with foreign policy concerns. Prior scholarship has
4
5
tended to focus on particular statutes, particular cases, or the general
6
concept of civil litigation against terrorism. In contrast, this Note
begins with the conflict and proceeds to examine related civil cases
brought in U.S. courts.

1. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998). For a more
thorough discussion of this case, see infra Part III.
2. Belhas v. Ya’alon, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/
ourcases/current-cases/belhas-v.-ya’alon (last visited Aug. 30, 2010); see also Belhas v. Ya’alon,
515 F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2008). For additional discussion, see infra Part IV.
3. As used in this Note, the Arab-Israeli conflict means not only the conflict between
Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews, but also the wider conflict between the State of Israel, Arab
and Muslim countries, and nonstate actors such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The term Arab-Israeli
conflict is used with the knowledge that Iran—referred to throughout as a participant in the
conflict—is not an Arab nation.
4. See, e.g., S. Jason Baletsa, Comment, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the
Theory and Practice of the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1247, 1300 (2000) (arguing that the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2006), is a “futile weapon”).
5. See, e.g., Graham Ogilvy, Note, Belhas v. Ya’alon: The Case for a Jus Cogens Exception
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 169 (2009) (arguing that
because “General Ya’alon’s actions constitute serious jus cogens violations” the D.C. Circuit
should not have extended Israel’s sovereign immunity to his conduct).
6. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Introduction to CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM
3, 5 (John Norton Moore ed., 2004) (arguing that in light of universal condemnation of terrorism
“it is hardly a stretch to ask how the civil justice system might more effectively also contribute to
deterrence against such heinous acts” (emphasis omitted)).
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The purpose of this approach is twofold. First, the Note
categorizes different types of U.S. civil cases that are connected with
the Arab-Israeli conflict. After discussing the factual background of
one or more important cases in each category, this Note examines
how courts have handled that category of cases. Second, the Note
analyzes how courts have resolved cases in these different categories
and the impact of those decisions on the broader concept of civil
litigation against terrorism.
Part I examines civil suits against the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the first
kind of litigation brought in U.S. courts related to the Arab-Israeli
7
conflict. Part II reviews civil actions against nonstate material
supporters of terrorism, focusing on attempts by David Boim’s
parents to hold U.S.-based funders of the Palestinian terrorist group
Hamas liable for their son’s murder. Part III discusses suits against
Iran under the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the Foreign
8
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), including Stephen Flatow’s
attempt to hold the Iranian government liable for funding the
Palestinian terrorists who murdered his daughter. Part IV looks at
suits against Israel and Israeli leaders under the Alien Tort Statute
9
(ATS), including attempts by Saadallah Belhas and others to sue
Israeli General Moshe Ya’alon for the shelling of Qana. Part V
examines the efforts of the family of Rachel Corrie—a U.S. citizen
killed by an Israeli bulldozer—to hold Caterpillar, the bulldozer’s
U.S. manufacturer, liable. Part VI offers some preliminary
conclusions derived from an examination of the different categories
of cases. Finally, Part VII examines how these cases inform the
concept of private civil litigation against terrorism, which has
advanced beyond the confines of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a tool to
10
combat terrorism in general. The Note concludes that U.S. courts
have proven competent to adjudicate complex issues related to the
Arab-Israeli conflict and that, despite numerous problems with these

7. The order of presentation in the Note does not imply any judgment about the relative
importance of the categories discussed.
8. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006).
9. ATS, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
10. The definition of “terrorism” is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note
examines how courts have construed different acts of violence related to the Arab-Israeli
conflict and how this characterization impacts civil litigation against terrorism—as that term is
understood in the statutes authorizing such suits.
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cases, abandoning civil litigation against terrorism would be
premature.
I. SUITS AGAINST THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
This Part will examine civil lawsuits filed in U.S. courts against
11
the Palestine Liberation Organization
and the Palestinian
12
Authority over their alleged involvement in terrorism. It will trace
the evolution of the role of U.S. courts both before and after the
13
passage of the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA), which provides a
cause of action to U.S. citizens injured by acts of international
14
terrorism. In the cases decided before the passage of the ATA—Tel15
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic and Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
16
Lauro —the courts struggled to determine which legal principles to
17
apply. In contrast, Knox v. PLO (Knox I), decided after the passage
of the ATA, is one of many suits brought by U.S. citizens in which
courts have imposed liability on the PA and PLO for acts of
18
terrorism.

11. The PLO was founded in 1964 as the umbrella organization of the Palestinian national
liberation movement. Palestine Liberation Organization: Introduction, PERMANENT OBSERVER
MISSION OF PALESTINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.int/palestine/
theplointro.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
12. The PA was established as the governing body of the Palestinian Territories pursuant
to the Oslo Accords, signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993. The Oslo Accords, 1993, OFF. OF
THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1990-2000/Oslo (last
visited Aug. 30, 2010); see also Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (establishing a framework for the
creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority). The PA is not a member of the
United Nations, Non-Member States and Entities, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
members/nonmembers.shtml (last updated Feb. 29, 2008), nor is it recognized as an independent
state by the United States, Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 29,
2009), http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm.
13. ATA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2006).
14. Id. § 2333(a) (“Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property,
or business by reason of an act of international terrorism . . . may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she
sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”).
15. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
16. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
17. Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 248 F.R.D. 420
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
18. See infra note 53.
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A. Suits Prior to the Implementation of the ATA
The first major attempt to sue the PLO in a U.S. court was TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a D.C. Circuit case in which a group
of mainly Israeli citizens brought a claim against, among others, Libya
19
and the PLO for a 1978 terrorist attack on an Israeli bus. The
20
plaintiffs filed suit under the ATS, which permits an alien to sue in
21
U.S. courts for torts committed against the law of nations. In
22
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, decided a few years prior to Tel-Oren, the
23
Second Circuit had given new life to this largely unused provision.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit
in Tel-Oren, with all three judges on the panel writing separate
24
concurring opinions. Judge Harry Edwards reasoned that because
25
the PLO was not a recognized state, it could not be held to violate
26
international law regarding torture under Filartiga. He also
determined that terrorism did not “amount to [a] law of nations
27
violation[].” Judge Robert Bork held that the ATS was only
jurisdictional and did not create a cause of action permitting the
28
plaintiffs to sue. He was also concerned that a ruling on the PLO’s
29
liability for the attack could interfere with U.S. foreign policy.
Finally, he believed that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim for a

19. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
21. Id. (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
22. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. See id. at 887 (“Although the Alien Tort Statute has rarely been the basis for
jurisdiction during its long history . . . there can be little doubt that this action is properly
brought in federal court.” (footnotes omitted)).
24. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring); id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring); id.
at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 787.
27. Id. The lack of international consensus regarding the permissibility of terrorism
convinced Judge Edwards that the law of nations had not yet “outlaw[ed] politically motivated
terrorism.” Id. at 796.
28. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork, citing Blackstone, believed that the ATS
was originally concerned with “[v]iolation[s] of safeconducts,” “[i]nfringement of the rights of
embassadors,” and “[p]iracy.” Id. at 813 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*68, *72). The Supreme Court has subsequently adopted a similar view, holding that
contemporary ATS claims must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
29. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 805 (Bork, J., concurring).
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violation of customary international law because there was no
30
international consensus regarding the definition of terrorism. Judge
Roger Robb held the entire suit nonjusticiable under the political
question doctrine because “[i]nternational terrorism consists of a web
that the courts are not positioned to unweave,” and they would be
31
interfering in U.S. foreign policy if they tried.
A year after Tel-Oren was decided, terrorists seized the Italian
passenger ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean Sea and murdered
32
a wheelchair-bound U.S. passenger, Leon Klinghoffer. His wife and
daughters sued the PLO, whom they alleged to be responsible for the
hijacking, as well as the shipowner and trip organizer, who impleaded
33
the PLO. The PLO moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter and
34
personal jurisdiction and for nonjusticiability.
The district court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction
35
under both the federal admiralty jurisdiction statute and the Death
36
on the High Seas Act because the alleged terrorist activities
37
occurred on a ship in navigable waters. It had personal jurisdiction
under state law based on the presence of the PLO’s U.N. mission in
38
New York. Moreover, the court rejected the PLO’s argument that
Tel-Oren stood for the proposition that suits against it were
39
nonjusticiable political questions, characterizing the matter before it
40
as an “act[] of piracy” within its jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the PLO’s argument that
41
it qualified for immunity as a sovereign state under the FSIA. The
Second Circuit also upheld the district court’s refusal to apply the
42
political question doctrine to “an ordinary tort suit.” Relying on

30. Id. at 806–07.
31. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
32. Judith Miller, Hijackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain, 400 are Safe; U.S. Assails
Deal with Captors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1985, at A1.
33. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 856–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
34. Id. at 858.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
36. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761–768 (1982) (current version at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30301–30308 (2006)).
37. Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 858–59.
38. Id. at 863.
39. Id. at 860.
40. Id.
41. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1602–1611 (1988)).
42. Id. at 49–50.

SCHUPACK IN FINAL

2010]

9/8/2010 11:38:51 AM

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

213

Supreme Court precedent, the court wrote that “the doctrine is one of
43
‘political questions,’ not . . . ‘political cases.’” The court also
reasoned that the political branches “have expressly endorsed the
44
concept of suing terrorist organizations in federal courts.”
Nevertheless, the court remanded on personal jurisdiction and service
of process grounds, determining that only the PLO’s non-U.N. related
45
activities could be the basis of jurisdiction. After several years of
litigation, the PLO reportedly settled the case with the Klinghoffer
46
family.
B. The Antiterrorism Act
Klinghoffer spurred the passage of the Antiterrorism Act of
47
1990. Many in Congress viewed the result of the Klinghoffer suit
favorably and were concerned that only admiralty jurisdiction and
48
fortuitous PLO contact with New York allowed it to proceed. Many
members of Congress also felt that such suits should be permitted
49
more broadly against the perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Thus,
Congress passed the ATA, which provides that “[a]ny national of the
United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or
50
her . . . survivors . . . may sue” in U.S. district court. The ATA
permits successful plaintiffs to collect treble damages and attorney’s
51
52
fees. Use of the ATA was infrequent, however, until recently.

43. Id. at 49 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
44. Id. at 49–50 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333(a) (West Supp. 1990) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006)); Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S.
Dep’t. of State, to Carmen B. Ciparick, Justice, N.Y. Supreme Court (Sept. 4, 1986)).
45. Id. at 50–51.
46. Benjamin Weiser, A Settlement with P.L.O. over Terror on a Cruise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1997, at A6.
47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2006). The ATA was originally enacted in 1990, but it was
repealed and reenacted in 1992 due to an enrolling error. Id. ch. 113B codification note.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (1992).
49. Id.; see also 137 CONG. REC. S8143 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The ATA
removes the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims and it empowers victims
with all the weapons available in civil litigation . . . .”).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (noting that the statute
intends “to facilitate civil actions” against international terrorism and to extend “civil
jurisdiction to accommodate the reach of international terrorism”).
51. Id.
52. Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the
International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and CommonLaw Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 679, 684 (2005); see also John F. Murphy, Civil Lawsuits
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C. Suits against the PA and PLO under the ATA
In 2002, a Palestinian gunman burst into a bat mitzvah reception
in Hadera, Israel, killing six—including Aharon Ellis, a U.S. citizen
53
who was singing with the band at the celebration. Alleging that the
PA and PLO were responsible for the attack, Ellis’s decedents sued
54
them under the ATA. The PA and PLO moved to dismiss the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity
55
and for nonjusticiability, but the district court denied the defendants’
56
motion. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that they were
entitled to sovereign immunity for two reasons. First, the court held
that the PLO and PA did not meet the criteria for statehood because
they lacked control over a defined territory and the capacity to
57
engage in foreign relations. Alternatively, the court held that it could
not grant sovereign immunity in the absence of executive branch
58
recognition.
The district court’s rejection of the defendants’ nonjusticiability
argument rested on the maxim that “the doctrine is one of ‘political
59
questions,’ not one of ‘political cases’” and on Klinghoffer’s finding
that a suit for injuries suffered as a result of a terrorist attack is a
“common law tort claim[]” that is “‘constitutionally committed’ to the
60
judicial branch.” Congress’s creation of a statutory basis for these
61
suits—the ATA—was also significant to the court. Yet the court
expressed concern that each side was seeking to manipulate the case
as a Legal Response to International Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM,
supra note 6, at 35, 42–43 (“[T]he ATA has been a form of ‘stealth’ legislation, largely ignored
until recently.”).
53. Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 248 F.R.D.
420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). This Note discusses Knox because the PA subsequently moved for relief
from judgment in this case. Knox does not otherwise differ significantly from other cases
brought against the PA and PLO. E.g., Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005); Sokolow v.
PLO, 583 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 424 F. Supp.
2d 153 (D.D.C. 2006); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 422 F. Supp. 2d 96
(D.D.C. 2006); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C.
2004).
54. Knox I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
55. Id. at 426.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 429, 434–38 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987)).
58. Id. at 448 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964)).
59. Id. at 449 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
60. Id. (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49–50 (2d Cir. 1991)).
61. Id.
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for its own political ends. Cautioning that its examination was limited
and focused, the court emphasized that its responsibilities did not
include “answer[ing] . . . these broader and intractable political
62
questions which form the backdrop to this lawsuit.” Rather, the
court’s job was limited to “adjudicat[ing] whether and to what extent
the plaintiffs may recover against the defendants under certain causes
63
of action for the violence that occurred in Hadera.” After losing
their motion to dismiss, the PA and PLO decided not to continue
litigating the case, resulting in a default judgment in excess of $192
64
million.
65
Following default judgments in Knox I and several other cases,
the Palestinian leadership instituted a change in policy. The new
Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, announced to Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice that the PA and PLO now intended to litigate
66
these suits. Pursuant to this new policy, the PA and PLO filed a
motion for relief from the Knox I judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, citing their change of leadership
67
and legal strategy (Knox II). The PA and PLO presented
“evidence . . . that, if proven at a trial, would constitute a complete
68
defense to Plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting theory of liability.” The PA
and PLO also asked the U.S. government to file a statement of
interest with the court, which the U.S. government, although
expressing concern about the judgment’s impact on Palestinian
69
finances, declined to do. Despite the U.S. government’s abstention
70
from direct involvement in the case, the court granted the motion,
62. Id. at 448.
63. Id.
64. The statute stipulates that any successful plaintiff “shall recover threefold the damages
he or she sustains and the cost of the suit.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2006). A default judgment of
$192,740,660.13 was entered on August 1, 2006. Knox v. PLO (Knox II), 248 F.R.D. 420, 423–24
(2008).
65. E.g., Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005).
66. Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 424–25.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 428.
69. Glenn Kessler, Administration Won’t Take Sides in Terrorism Case Against
Palestinians, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2008, at A16 (noting that, while the Bush administration was
concerned that such lawsuits could harm the “financial and political viability” of the PA,
“[g]overnment lawyers decided that the Palestinian Authority had had sufficient opportunities
to contest the Knox verdict” and that “the administration . . . did not want to appear indifferent
to terrorism victims’ needs”).
70. Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 433; see also Benjamin Weiser, Palestinians Get 2nd Try in
Terror Suit, But at a Price, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at B1 (“The lawyer for Mr. Ellis’s
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noting the changing political dynamic of the PA, the new leadership’s
71
commitment to litigate in good faith, and the size of the judgment.
Rather than litigate the case, however, the PLO and PA decided to
72
settle it, paying an undisclosed sum to the plaintiffs.
This review of suits against the PLO and PA shows how courts’
handling of such cases has evolved with the passage of the ATA.
First, prior to the enactment of the ATA, Tel-Oren affirmed the
dismissal of a suit against the PLO. Following the enactment of the
ATA, courts have generally followed the direction of Congress in
permitting these suits to go forward, construing them as ordinary tort
suits and not applying the political question doctrine. Second, it is
critical in these cases that the PA and the PLO do not enjoy sovereign
immunity and that the executive branch has refrained from arguing
for their dismissal. Third, though the PA and PLO’s failure to contest
these suits has in the past resulted in courts entering default
judgments on the basis of uncontested evidence, the Palestinian
leadership’s recent commitment to litigating these cases indicates that
courts may soon be called upon to more completely adjudicate these
73
cases on the merits. If these cases are litigated on the merits, Knox
suggests that plaintiffs may not be able to win them. Fourth, the size
of the judgments and lack of attachable PLO and PA assets has made
74
it difficult for plaintiffs to collect on their judgments. The recent
decision by the PA and PLO to settle the Knox case, however,
indicates that these suits may in fact be an effective tool in the fight
75
against terrorism.
II. BOIM: SUITS AGAINST MATERIAL SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM
This Part examines suits against private material supporters of
terrorism under the ATA through the lens of Boim v. Quranic
family . . . believes the defendants are misleading the court and concealing property . . . .”). The
court ultimately required the posting of a $120 million bond. Knox v. PLO (Knox III), 628 F.
Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
71. Knox II, 248 F.R.D. at 430–31.
72. Josh Gerstein, Palestinians Reverse on Terror Victim, POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2010, 11:56
PM EST), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/33021.html.
73. Compare Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 675 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107
(D.D.C. 2009) (vacating a default judgment entered against the PA and PLO), with Biton v.
Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 252 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2008) (expressly refusing to follow
Knox in vacating a default judgment entered against the PA and PLO).
74. See Weiser, supra note 70 (describing the precarious financial situation of the PA).
75. See Gerstein, supra note 72 (noting that the PA may have settled another case that was
abruptly dropped in 2008).
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76

Literacy Institute. After laying out the facts of Boim, it discusses the
Seventh Circuit’s conflicting interpretations of the breadth of material
support liability and the impact of such liability on the First
Amendment rights of alleged violators.
David Boim, a dual Israeli-U.S. citizen, was murdered in a 1996
77
West Bank shooting attack, allegedly by Hamas terrorists. His
parents sued a number of individuals and organizations in federal
court under the ATA, including alleged U.S.-based Hamas supporters
Muhammad Salah, the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI), the Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), the Islamic
Association for Palestine (IAP), and the American Muslim Society
78
(AMS). The Boims alleged that Salah, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was
the U.S.-based leader of the military wing of Hamas, and that HLF,
whose assets the United States froze in 2001, supplied funds to
79
Hamas. AMS and IAP, which were found to be one organization,
80
allegedly supported Hamas through HLF. The plaintiffs alleged that
81
QLI, for whom Salah worked, was also a Hamas front organization.
The district court granted summary judgment against HLF,

76. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim II), 340 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2004), vacated
sub nom. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated,
549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). Although Boim, like
Knox, was brought under the ATA, this Note classifies it separately because suits against
private parties have a lesser impact upon foreign policy. The U.S. government also expressed
support for the use of the ATA in the Boim case. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Affirmance at 2, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (Nos.
01-1969, 01-1970). Another line of cases involves suits by more than 1,600 plaintiffs against the
Jordan-based Arab Bank for allegedly funneling money from wealthy Saudis through its New
York office to the families of Palestinian terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza. Lev v. Arab
Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251(NG)(VVP), 2010 WL 623636 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010); Litle v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 611 F. Supp. 2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp.
2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Arab Bank, PLC, 06 CV 1623(NG)(VVP), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94029 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). Plaintiffs have also attempted to bring similar suits against the Swiss bank
UBS with mixed results. Compare Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (refusing to dismiss suit against UBS), with Rothstein v. UBS AG, 647 F. Supp. 2d 292,
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing suit against UBS).
77. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 511 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir.
2007), vacated, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).
78. Boim II, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 890. Salah’s name appears as both “Mohammed” and
“Muhammad.” Compare id. at 890 (“Mohammed”), with id. at 922 (“Muhammad”).
79. Boim III, 511 F.3d at 712–13.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 713–14. QLI’s ostensible mission was translating Islamic texts into English. Id. at
714.
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AMS/IAP, and Salah; a jury found QLI liable as well. The jury
awarded $52 million in damages, which the court trebled to $156
83
million pursuant to the ATA.
On direct appeal (Boim III), the two major issues were the
availability of aiding and abetting liability for acts of terrorism under
the ATA and the showing required to hold the defendants liable. The
Seventh Circuit had previously ruled on these questions in an
84
interlocutory appeal (Boim I). In that decision, the court held that
aiding and abetting liability was available under the ATA, even
though the statute did not expressly provide for it, because “Congress
expressed an intent . . . to import general tort law principles, and
85
those principles include aiding and abetting liability.” Thus, the
court explained, the holding would be consistent with the
congressional “purpose of cutting off the flow of money to terrorists
86
at every point along the chain of causation.” The Court thus
distinguished Boim from Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
87
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., in which the Supreme Court held
that there was no private right of action for aiding and abetting
88
liability unless explicitly mentioned in the statute. In addition, the
court determined that the Boims would have “to show[, first,]
knowledge of and intent to further” Hamas terrorism, not just
89
funding of it, and second, “that murder was a reasonably foreseeable
90
result of making a donation.” The court reasoned that this
requirement would be consistent with the “intent by Congress to
codify general common law tort principles and to extend civil liability
for acts of international terrorism to the full reaches of traditional tort
91
law.”

82. Id. at 710. Although QLI received a jury trial, the court limited the evidence the Boims
needed to present to establish QLI’s liability, including through a finding of fact that Hamas had
killed David Boim. Id. at 719.
83. Id. at 719.
84. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002). This
interlocutory appeal arose from Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D.
Ill. 2001).
85. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019.
86. Id.
87. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
88. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1017 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174).
89. Id. at 1011.
90. Id. at 1012.
91. Id. at 1010.
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In a 2 to 1 decision, the same panel of the Seventh Circuit that
heard the interlocutory appeal reversed the district court’s application
92
of its principles (Boim III). The panel believed that the district court
had erred in failing to require the Boims to show that the defendants’
93
actions were a cause in fact of their son’s death.
The Seventh Circuit sitting en banc, however, vacated the panel’s
94
decision. Revisiting the issue of aiding and abetting liability under
the ATA, Judge Richard Posner returned to the Central Bank of
95
Denver standard, holding that “statutory silence on the subject of
96
secondary liability means there is none.” Instead, through a “chain
of explicit statutory incorporations by reference,” he found “that a
donation to a terrorist group that targets Americans outside the
97
United States may violate” the ATA. This was “[p]rimary liability”
98
with “the character of secondary liability.” Thus, one who provided
material support after the enactment of the statute criminalizing such
99
support and knew that the funds would be used to carry out acts of
terrorism against U.S. citizens overseas could be liable under the
100
ATA. Because Salah was in an Israeli prison between the effective
date of the statute and Boim’s killing, the court reversed the
101
judgment against him.
At the same time, the en banc majority believed that the panel
102
had set the standard for knowledge and causation too high. Judge
Posner likened liability for the provision of material support to
103
terrorists to liability for fires with multiple origins, writing that in
such cases “the requirement of proving causation is relaxed because

92. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim III), 511 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir.
2007), vacated, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).
93. Id. at 741.
94. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (Boim IV), 549 F.3d 685, 705 (7th Cir.
2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).
95. See discussion supra notes 87–88.
96. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 689.
97. Id. at 690. This chain stretched from 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) to 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) to 18
U.S.C. § 2339A to 18 U.S.C. § 2332. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 690.
98. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 691.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
100. Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 691.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 702.
103. See id. at 695 (describing cases in which a defendant was found liable for starting a fire
that combined with another fire of unknown cause and destroyed the plaintiff’s property, for
example Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)).
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otherwise there would be a wrong and an injury but no remedy
because the court would be unable to determine which wrongdoer
104
inflicted the injury.” Thus, if one contributed to Hamas knowingly
or recklessly, thereby “significantly enhanc[ing] the risk of terrorist
acts and thus the probability that the plaintiff’s decedent would be a
105
victim,” one could be liable. Judge Posner concluded that only two
types of support were excepted from liability: donations to charities
by individuals who did not know or were not reckless in failing to
discover that the charity gives money to terrorists and contributions
106
to medical organizations that assist all individuals.
Applying these principles to the other defendants, the court
107
upheld the district court’s judgments against AMS/IAP and QLI.
The court held that AMS/IAP knew it was giving money to Hamas,
108
which was sufficient to hold it liable. The court also found that
despite the district court’s finding of fact that Hamas was responsible
for Boim’s murder, the jury nevertheless found QLI liable on the
109
question of material support to Hamas. QLI waived its ability to
110
object, however, by its refusal to fully participate at trial.
Not all of the Seventh Circuit judges agreed with Judge Posner’s
interpretation. The dissenting judges were concerned about the
potential scope of liability under the majority’s decision and about the
decision’s possible impact on the defendants’ First Amendment
111
rights. The dissent contended that the majority departed from tort
principles by not requiring the plaintiffs to show causation and the
112
intent to fund terrorism. This expansive tort liability would make it
difficult for courts to draw distinctions between purposeful and
113
unintentional funding of terrorism, which could implicate First
Amendment freedoms by criminalizing donations to an organization
that engages in both legal and illegal activity or, unlike Hamas, is not
104. Id. at 697.
105. Id. at 698.
106. Id. at 699 (naming the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders as such organizations).
107. Id. at 701. The court reversed the verdict against HLF on the ground that the district
court should not have collaterally estopped HLF from challenging a D.C. Circuit finding that it
had funded Hamas. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 702.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 705–06 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 724–25
(Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. Id. at 705 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id.
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114

designated as a terrorist organization. The dissent contended that
the majority’s approach could also lead to liability solely for
115
advocating on behalf of or showing affiliation with a terrorist group.
There are several preliminary conclusions that one can draw
from the admittedly small number of cases in this category, including
Boim and a series of suits against the Arab Bank for allegedly
116
funneling money to Palestinian terrorists. First, despite a lack of
117
international consensus on the definition of terrorism, many U.S.
courts appear willing to use the definition of terrorism that Congress
118
has provided. Second, it is difficult for plaintiffs to establish
causation and liability in material support cases because of the
shadowy nature of terrorist financing networks. Third, given the
frequently indirect nature of this material support, scope of liability is
often an issue, especially with regard to contributions to groups that
have both terroristic and political or charitable branches. The
Supreme Court, however, has recently upheld the constitutionality of
the material-support statute against a First Amendment challenge
brought by U.S.-based organizations and individuals who wished to
provide support to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the
Tamil Tigers (LTTE), both of which the United States has designated
119
as terrorist organizations. The Court held that the judgment of
Congress and the executive branch in criminalizing material support
120
was entitled to deference.
114. Id. at 713.
115. Id. at 713–14 (“[A]n individual may not be held . . . liable for his mere association with
an organization whose members engage in illegal acts.” Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982)).
116. More than 1,600 plaintiffs have filed suit against the Jordan-based bank. E.g., Litle v.
Arab Bank, PLC, 611 F. Supp. 2d 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp.
2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 06 CV 1623(NG)(VVP), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94029 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
117. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban
Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2002)
(“[T]here is no precisely agreed upon international definition of terrorism as a crime.”).
118. See, e.g., Boim IV, 549 F.3d at 690 (using the statutory definitions of terrorism provided
by Congress to find that liability exists for providing support to terrorist organizations targeting
Americans outside the United States).
119. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722–30 (2010).
120. Id. at 2728 (“At bottom, plaintiffs simply disagree with the considered judgment of
Congress and the Executive that providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist
organization—even seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist activities of that
organization. That judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, and we have persuasive
evidence before us to sustain it.”).
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III. SUITS AGAINST IRAN
Although some plaintiffs have successfully held private parties
civilly liable for aiding terrorism, more plaintiffs have chosen to sue a
state—the Islamic Republic of Iran—over its support of terrorism.
This Part describes how Congress has abrogated the sovereign
immunity of Iran to permit such suits. It then discusses the foremost
example of this trend: Stephen Flatow’s attempt to hold Iran
accountable for the murder of his daughter in a bus bombing in the
121
Gaza Strip.
A. The State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception to FSIA
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides the exclusive
basis for subject matter and personal jurisdiction in suits against
122
foreign nations, and U.S. courts only have jurisdiction under the
123
FSIA if one of the exceptions to immunity applies. Concerned
about the ability of state sponsors of terrorism to hide behind
sovereign immunity, Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to abrogate their sovereign immunity as part of the
124
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
Though the executive branch initially objected to the bill, President
125
Bill Clinton signed it into law. This abrogation of immunity applied
only to those countries on the State Department’s list of state
126
sponsors of terrorism. The State Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment,
however, proved insufficient to enable Flatow to bring his lawsuit, so

121. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
122. Id. at 11 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983)).
123. Id. (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989)). The exceptions to immunity include waiver; commercial activity carried out by a
foreign state; personal injury, death, or damage to property occurring in the U.S. caused by a
tortious act or omission of the foreign state or one of its officials, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006),
as well as sponsorship of terrorism, id. § 1605A (Supp. II 2008).
124. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241–43 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605, a part of FSIA).
125. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 80–81 (noting that the U.S. Departments of State and
Justice “strongly opposed” the FSIA amendments).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. These states are listed at the State Department’s recommendation
under three separate statutory bases: 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j), 22 U.S.C. § 2371, and 22 U.S.C.
§ 2780(d). There are only four countries currently on the list: Iran, Cuba, Sudan, and Syria. State
Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited
Aug. 30, 2010). Iraq was removed from the list in 2004, Presidential Determination No. 2004-52,
3 C.F.R. 295 (2005), Libya in 2006, Presidential Determination No. 2006-14, 3 C.F.R. 283 (2007),
and North Korea in 2008, Memorandum of June 26, 2008, 3 C.F.R. 289 (2009).
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Congress responded by passing another bill, known as the Flatow
Amendment, that allowed civil litigation for acts of state-sponsored
127
terrorism. The Flatow Amendment provided an explicit cause of
action to U.S. nationals or their representatives seeking to sue
“an . . . official, employee, or agent of a foreign state” under the State
128
Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment. It also made punitive damages
129
available.
In 2008, the State Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment and the
Flatow Amendment were both repealed and replaced with a new
130
section, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. The new statute includes an exception
to sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism and a cause of
131
action for victims of terrorism and their decedents. The cause of
action is broader, explicitly including foreign terrorist states in
132
addition to their agents, officials, and employees. In addition to
specifying that punitive damages are available, the new law also
provides for the attachment of the property of a foreign state even if
133
the state does not directly control the property.
B. The Flatow Case
Twenty-year-old American student Alisa Flatow was murdered
in an April 9, 1995, terrorist attack on an Israeli bus in the Gaza
134
Strip. The Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
127. Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. a, § 589,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note); see also Jack Goldsmith &
Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION
AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 6, at 137 (discussing the Flatow Amendment). Stephen
Flatow’s lawsuit is discussed in more detail in Part III.B, infra.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note.
129. Id.
130. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083,
122 Stat. 3, 338 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. II 2008)); see also JENNIFER K. ELSEA,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 48–
62 (2008) (describing the changes implemented in the new legislation).
131. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 48–49 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
133. Id.
134. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998). Although this Note
focuses on Flatow, other cases connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict have been filed against
Iran. Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009); Wachsman v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 603 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2009); Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F. Supp. 2d 200
(D.D.C. 2008); Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2008);
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 2007); Sisso v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, No. 1:05CV394(JDB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48526 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007);
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135

claimed responsibility. Stephen Flatow, Alisa’s father, filed a
wrongful death suit under the FSIA’s State Sponsor of Terrorism
136
Amendment and the Flatow Amendment against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security
137
(MOIS), and three Iranian leaders. Although served with process,
138
the defendants did not appear.
Pursuant to the FSIA, Flatow needed to provide satisfactory
139
evidence to establish his right to relief. Flatow presented evidence
of the State Department’s conclusion that the PIJ had perpetrated the
140
bombing and received about $2 million annually from Iran. Iran,
which was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984, was found
to have provided “material support and resources to [PIJ]” through
141
the MOIS with the approval of the individual defendants. The court
concluded that “Alisa Michelle Flatow’s death was caused by a willful
and deliberate act of extrajudicial killing . . . by . . . the [PIJ] acting
142
under the direction of [the] [d]efendants.”
The district court read the State Sponsor of Terrorism
143
Amendment and the Flatow Amendment together.
Because
“Congress has expressly directed the retroactive application” of the
Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 2006); Bodoff v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 424 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2006); Ben Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425
F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2006); Stern v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.D.C.
2003); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D.D.C. 2003); Weinstein v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002); Mousa v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
238 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2000). Several cases related to the Arab-Israeli conflict are also discussed in Matter of
Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation, 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 46–59 (D.D.C. 2009).
135. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 8.
136. Id. at 12. Congress passed the Flatow Amendment to help Flatow bring his lawsuit.
137. Id. at 9–10. Those leaders include Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who remains Supreme
Leader of Iran, Profile: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
3018932.stm (last updated June 17, 2009, 13:22 GMT), and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, who continues to chair both the Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for
appointing the Supreme Leader, and the Expediency Council, which handles legislative
disputes, Profile: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/4104532.stm (last updated June 19, 2009, 11:47 GMT).
138. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6. The court noted that “[t]he Islamic Republic of Iran is an
experienced litigant in the United States federal court system.” Id. at 6 n.1. When the plaintiff
attempted to serve Iran through the mail, the envelope was returned with “DO NOT USA”
written across it. Id.
139. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994)).
140. Id. at 9.
141. Id. at 9–10.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id. at 12–13.
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State Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment and “international terrorism
is subject to universal jurisdiction,” the court found that “[d]efendants
had adequate notice that their actions were wrongful and susceptible
144
to adjudication in the United States.” Moreover, the court held
extraterritorial application of the statutes proper, since applying them
only to countries listed as state sponsors of terrorism did not interfere
145
in foreign affairs.
The court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction,
146
determining that the statutory requirements had been met. The
147
court held that a suicide bombing constituted “extrajudicial killing.”
“[T]he routine provision of financial assistance to a terrorist group in
support of its terrorist activities” qualified as “providing material
148
support or resources” under the statute. There was no requirement
that “a plaintiff . . . establish that the material support . . . provided by
149
a foreign state for a terrorist act contributed directly to the act.”
Finally, the court found that if the state-sponsored terrorism
150
exception applied, personal jurisdiction was established. The court
awarded Flatow $22.5 million in compensatory damages and $225
151
million in punitive damages.

144. Id. at 13–14.
145. Id. at 16.
146. Id. at 16–19. The requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) are:
(1) that personal injury or death resulted from an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking; and (2) the act was either perpetrated by the
foreign state directly or by a non-state actor which receives material support or
resources from the foreign state defendant; and (3) the act or the provision of
material support or resources is engaged in by an agent, official or employee of the
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, agency or employment;
and (4) that the foreign state be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism either at
the time the incident complained of occurred or was later so designated as a result of
such act; and (5) if the incident complained of occurred within the foreign state
defendant’s territory, plaintiff has offered the defendants a reasonable opportunity to
arbitrate the matter; and (6) either the plaintiff or the victim was a United States
national at the time of the incident; and (7) similar conduct by United States agents,
officials or employees within the United States would be actionable.
Id. at 16 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). This provision was repealed in
2008 and replaced with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
147. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 18.
148. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).
149. Id. (citing § 1605(a)(7)).
150. Id. at 19–23.
151. Id. at 5. The $225 million figure was three times Iran’s alleged annual expenditure on
terrorist activities. Id. at 34; see also Bill Miller & Barton Gellman, Judge Tells Iran to Pay
Terrorism Damages; $247 Million Award for Family of U.S. Victim in Gaza Strip, WASH. POST,
Mar. 12, 1998, at A1 (discussing the outcome of the Flatow case).
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C. The Struggle to Enforce the Judgment
After receiving his judgment, Stephen Flatow attempted to
enforce it by attaching an arbitral award granted to Iran by the Iran–
152
United States Claim Tribunal and rental proceeds and real estate
owned by Iran in Washington, D.C.—including the former Iranian
153
embassy. The United States intervened in both cases to argue that
154
the attachments should be quashed, and the court agreed. Despite
155
these setbacks, Flatow persisted in trying to enforce his judgment.
He criticized the U.S. government for blocking his attempt to attach
Iranian property and insinuated that the Clinton administration was
156
weak on terrorism, leading others to question the propriety of
157
Eventually,
allowing suits against state-sponsors of terrorism.
Flatow received a portion of his judgment through congressional
158
action. In this and similar cases, the U.S. Treasury has paid more
159
than $390 million to those with judgments against Iran. Despite
152. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
153. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1999).
154. Id. (granting U.S. motion to quash attachment which the government argued would
violate the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4316 (2006), and the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95); Flatow, 74 F. Supp. 2d at
20 (granting U.S. motion to quash attachment because the United States had sovereign
immunity).
155. See, e.g., Bill Miller & John Mintz, Once-Supportive U.S. Fights Family Over Iranian
Assets, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at A8 (“The award in the Flatow case has left the U.S.
government in a painful dilemma.”).
156. See Stephen M. Flatow, Op-Ed., In This Case, I Can’t be Diplomatic; I Lost a Child to
Terrorism; Now I’m Losing U.S. Support, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1999, at B2 (“But when I tried to
use the law, I found the U.S. government wasn’t really in my corner . . . . [The administration]
continue[s] to say that carrying out my judgment would endanger the security of the United
States. If that’s true, I’m the bad guy.”); Stephen M. Flatow, Op-Ed., Keep Fighting,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 1, 1998, at 10 (“Now, I find myself in the surreal position of being
opposed by the State Department in my attempts to enforce our judgment against Iranian assets
located in the United States.”).
157. See, e.g., Editorial, Lawsuits and Terrorism, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1999, at B6
(“Congress never should have passed, nor President Clinton signed, a law that could only offer
Mr. Flatow justice by depriving the administration of control over important instruments of
foreign policy. This law should be repealed.”).
158. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 15–16. The statute granted plaintiffs in cases against Cuba
and Iran that had been filed or would be handed down by a certain date the option of accepting
compensatory damages from the U.S. Treasury in return for ceding certain rights, including the
right to attach certain categories of property. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1543. Flatow received just over $26
million—his compensatory damages plus interest. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 69.
159. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 69–71 tbl.A-1. Many of these cases, however, concerned
Iran’s other terrorist activities in the Middle East not directly related to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, §
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these payments, as of March 2008 twenty-nine judgments against Iran
160
remained outstanding and not covered under any legislation. It is
unclear how these plaintiffs will be compensated, as the value of their
judgments far exceeds the estimated $1.1 million in blocked and $51
161
million in nonblocked Iranian assets in the United States.
The difficulty of collecting on these judgments led Chief Judge
Royce Lamberth of the D.C. District Court—who wrote the Flatow
opinion and heard many of the other cases against Iran—to conclude
that “[c]ivil litigation against Iran under the FSIA state sponsor of
terrorism exception represents a failed policy” because “these cases
do not achieve justice for victims, are not sustainable and threaten to
162
undermine the president’s foreign policy initiatives.” For instance,
Judge Lamberth estimated Iranian assets in the United States at $45
163
million and the outstanding judgments against Iran at $10 billion.
Yet Congress’s enactment of the new 28 U.S.C. § 1605A only serves
to “stoke the flames of unrealistic and unmanageable expectations in
164
these terrorism victims.” Judge Lamberth also expressed concern
that these suits could interfere with the Obama administration’s goal
165
of engagement with Iran. Although the court indicated that it will
166
Judge Lamberth
continue to apply the law in these suits,
“respectfully urge[d] the President and Congress to seek meaningful
reforms in this area of law in the form of a viable alternative to
167
private litigation.” In Judge Lamberth’s view, only Congress and the
president can “resolve the intractable political dilemmas that frustrate
168
these lawsuits.”
Despite the numerous criticisms of the lawsuits against Iran,
Congress has continued to enact the statutory authority that enables

686, 116 Stat. 1350, 1411 (2002), and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub L.
No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322, added additional plaintiffs. In addition, section 201 of TRIA made
frozen assets of terrorist states available for attachment. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 21–23.
160. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 72–74.
161. Id. at 75.
162. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2009).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 38.
165. See id. (“Today, at the start of a new presidential administration . . . it may be time for
our political leaders here in Washington to seek a fresh approach.”).
166. See id. at 140 (“[T]his Court wishes to stress that it . . . will endeavor to see to it that
plaintiffs in these actions get all the relief to which they are entitled under the law.”).
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id.
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169

them —and it makes institutional sense to do so. Congress can
appear tough on terrorism by authorizing suits on behalf of
constituents injured by terrorism while outsourcing responsibility for
the litigation to plaintiffs, their attorneys, and the judicial branch. The
executive’s responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs makes it
more sensitive to the impact of these suits on U.S. foreign relations,
but even that branch is likely to refrain from intervening too
vigorously on behalf of states like Iran for political reasons. Although
the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to reach out to
170
Iran, it remains unlikely that either Congress or the executive will
take action to prevent suits against an unfriendly regime.
IV. SUITS AGAINST ISRAEL AND ITS OFFICIALS
Though courts have allowed suits against Iran to go forward, this
Part discusses how judges have refused to abrogate Israeli sovereign
immunity to permit plaintiffs to sue Israel in U.S. courts.
171
In Belhas v. Ya’alon, the relatives of civilians who died or were
injured when an errant Israeli shell hit the U.N. compound in Qana,
Lebanon, sued Israeli General Moshe Ya’alon under the ATS and the
172
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) for war crimes and
173
extrajudicial killing.
In upholding the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit did not allow the plaintiffs to
174
engage in what the court considered an end-run around the FSIA.
The court found it dispositive that the plaintiffs had only alleged acts

169. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at Hradcany Square,
Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered (“My administration will seek
engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect.”).
171. Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
172. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(2006)).
173. Id. at 1281–82. General Ya’alon was the Head of Army Intelligence of the Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) during Operation Grapes of Wrath when the shelling of Qana occurred.
He was retired and serving as a fellow in a Washington, D.C., think tank when he was served
with process in the suit. Id. at 1281.
174. See id. at 1283 (“Instead of suing the foreign state of Israel, something prohibited by
the FSIA in the absence of allegation of any of the statutory exceptions, Plaintiffs sued a retired
Israeli general with at most a tangential relationship to the events at issue who made a
convenient visit to the District of Columbia.”).
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Ya’alon performed in his official capacity, as authorized by Israel.
The court held that an individual can qualify as an agent or
176
instrumentality of a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA.
Extending FSIA immunity to Ya’alon, the court also rejected the
plaintiffs’ contention that the FSIA does not apply to foreign officials
177
once they have left office. The plaintiffs also alleged that General
Ya’alon’s actions violated jus cogens norms of international law and
178
must therefore be outside the scope of his duties. The court,
however, declined to create a jus cogens exception to the FSIA in the
179
absence of specific congressional authorization.
180
In another case against Israeli officials, Doe I v. State of Israel,
a group of Palestinians—most of whom are U.S. citizens—living in
Israel, the West Bank, and the United States, sued various defendants
including Israeli leaders and settlers, as well as the settlers’ American
181
supporters. Basing their claims on numerous statutes—including the
ATS and the TVPA—the plaintiffs alleged genocide, war crimes, and
conspiracy to commit racketeering, all stemming from Israel’s
182
occupation of the West Bank. In dismissing the case, the district
court held that the FSIA protects Israeli officials acting in their
official capacities, and that “the personal capacity suits amount to
183
suits against the officers for being Israeli government officials.” The

175. Id. at 1282–83.
176. Id. at 1292 (citing El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
177. Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1286. In another case, relatives of those injured or killed in the
IDF’s 2002 bombing of a Gaza apartment complex sued Avraham Dichter, the director of the
Israeli Security Agency. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009). The State Department
expressed the view that the FSIA affords sovereign immunity to countries, not to individuals. Id.
at 11. The Second Circuit held that even if Dichter was not entitled to immunity under the
FSIA, he was entitled to common-law immunity. Id. at 15. The Supreme Court settled the
question of whether the FSIA applies to foreign officials acting in their official capacity, holding
that the FSIA does not grant immunity to such individuals, though it did not address whether
common-law immunity attaches. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286–92 (2010).
178. Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1286 (“[A] jus cogens norm . . . ‘is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted . . . .’” (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331))). For an argument that the court should have found Ya’alon’s actions to be a jus cogens
violation, see Ogilvy, supra note 5, at 195.
179. Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1287–88.
180. Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005).
181. Id. at 95–96. The American defendants included President George W. Bush, Secretary
of State Colin Powell, and several defense contractors. Id. at 96.
182. Id. at 97.
183. Id. at 105.
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court also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention of a jus cogens exception
184
to the FSIA. It did recognize, however, that some courts had
185
permitted violations of jus cogens norms to strip FSIA immunity.
The court’s broader concern was that the case was nonjusticiable:
It is hard to conceive of an issue more quintessentially political in
nature than the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict . . . .
Plaintiffs would have this Court adjudicate the rights and
liabilities of the Palestinian and Israeli people, making
determinations on such issues as to whom the land in the West Bank
actually belongs. Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare that Israel’s selfdefense policies are tantamount to terrorism, racketeering, or some
186
other form of illegal activity. The Court can do none of this.

This statement is characteristic of how courts have handled these
cases. Absent specific authorization from Congress to abrogate Israeli
sovereign immunity, courts generally have refused to do so.
Moreover, although courts have occasionally found the FSIA
inapplicable in suits against officials of foreign states based on
violations of jus cogens norms, they have generally granted immunity
to Israeli officials and are unlikely to recognize a jus cogens exception
187
in such cases.
This category of cases yields four conclusions. First, as Doe I
demonstrates, U.S. courts have generally recognized the political
nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel’s status as a U.S. ally, and
the major role that the region plays in U.S. foreign policy and
188
domestic politics.
Second, the courts have been reluctant to
abrogate the sovereign immunity of Israel or former Israeli officials
for acts committed within the scope of their official duties. The law in
this area, however, is unsettled. Since Belhas and Doe I were decided,
the Supreme Court has held that the FSIA does not apply to provide

184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994); Chuidian v.
Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990)).
186. Id. at 111–12 (citations omitted).
187. Numerous circuit courts have refused to recognize a jus cogens exception. E.g., Smith v.
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that
Congress did not intend a jus cogens exception to the FSIA).
188. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The United States . . . filed a
Statement of Interest . . . recognizing Dichter’s entitlement to immunity. . . . [E]ven if Dichter,
as a former foreign official, is not categorically eligible for immunity under the FSIA . . . he is
nevertheless immune from suit under common-law principles . . . .”).
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immunity to foreign government officials acting in their official
189
capacity. The Court emphasized, however, that it was not deciding
190
whether officials may still be entitled to common law immunity. In
191
Matar v. Dichter, the Second Circuit decided an Israeli official was
192
entitled to precisely such common law immunity for his official acts.
Third, unlike the cases against the PA and Iran, the Israeli defendants
193
have more vigorously defended themselves. Finally, the courts
recognize justiciability concerns because both Congress and the
executive have strong policy positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In
Belhas and Doe I, the courts recognized these suits as fundamentally
194
against Israel itself. They refused to allow such an end-run around
Israeli sovereign immunity. In contrast to suits against the PA and
Iran, therefore, courts resolving suits against Israel have directly
considered the political and foreign policy implications of ruling on
the matter before deciding to dismiss the suits. The courts make no
fine-grained distinctions between political cases and political
questions, nor do they find these claims to be ordinary torts.
V. CORRIE V. CATERPILLAR: CHALLENGING SALES TO ISRAEL
195

a U.S.
This Part examines a suit against Caterpillar,
corporation, for selling a bulldozer to Israel which ran over and killed
the plaintiffs’ daughter. The case was ultimately dismissed on political
question grounds, but it could mark the creation of a new category of
litigation relating to the conflict. Just as plaintiffs have increasingly
brought suits against corporations for alleged complicity in human
rights violations, litigants will likely continue to bring suits against
companies based on their sales of military equipment to Israel.
189. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2286–92 (2010) (holding that a Somali official was
not entitled to immunity for his official acts under the FSIA).
190. Id. at 2292–93.
191. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009).
192. Id. at 14.
193. See supra notes 171–76, 180–86 and accompanying text.
194. See Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Instead of suing the
foreign state of Israel, something prohibited by the FSIA . . . Plaintiffs sued a retired Israeli
general with at most a tangential relationship to the events at issue who made a convenient visit
to the District of Columbia.”); Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111–13 (D.D.C. 2005)
(refusing to adjudicate the merits of Israeli defense measures and the Israeli occupation of the
West Bank).
195. Caterpillar has also been the target of a public relations campaign decrying its sales to
Israel. Caterpillar Campaign, U.S. CAMPAIGN TO END THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION,
http://www.endtheoccupation.org/section.php?id=158 (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
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Rachel Corrie, a U.S. citizen, was killed in the Gaza Strip in 2003
when she was run over by an IDF bulldozer manufactured by
196
Caterpillar. Rather than sue Israeli leaders, her family—as well as
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza—sued Caterpillar for
197
violations of international law, racketeering, and wrongful death.
The district court determined that Caterpillar’s sale of a legal,
nondefective product did not violate a norm of international law
198
sufficient to establish an ATS claim. The court also held the matter
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, as the executive
and legislative branches had approved the U.S. policy of selling
199
weapons and other goods to Israel. Furthermore, the court found
that the act of state doctrine applied because the plaintiffs were
200
asking the court to pass judgment on official military acts of Israel.
201
Thus, the court dismissed the case.
202
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. On appeal it emerged that the U.S.
203
government had paid for Israel’s purchases of bulldozers. The court
204
found this fact decisive in applying the political question doctrine,
given that it was unable to reconcile the U.S. government’s
participation in the sale with the plaintiffs’ claims that such sales were

196. Gwynne Skinner, War Crimes Litigation in U.S. Courts: The Caterpillar Case 2
(Palestine Ctr., Information Paper No. 9, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304839.
197. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc. (Corrie I), 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023–24 (W.D. Wash. 2005),
aff’d, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007). See generally SKINNER, supra note 196 (providing
background on the incident and the case).
198. Corrie I, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1026. The Supreme Court has held that the standard for an
ATS claim is whether it “rest[s] on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
th
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 18 -century paradigms we have
recognized.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
199. Corrie I, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (“[N]either of the other branches of government has
urged or enjoined sale of weapons to Israel nor restrained trade with Israel in any other manner.
For this court to preclude sales of Caterpillar products to Israel would be to make a foreign
policy decision and to impinge directly upon the prerogatives of the executive branch of
government.”).
200. Id. (“The Act of State Doctrine . . . precludes United States courts from judging the
validity of a foreign sovereign’s official acts . . . .”).
201. Id. at 1033.
202. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc. (Corrie II), 503 F.3d 974, 984 (9th Cir. 2007).
203. Id. at 978.
204. Id. at 982–83.
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205

wrongful. Thus, although the plaintiffs could still sue in Israeli
206
courts, U.S. courts were not open to their claim.
Had the Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiffs’ claim to proceed,
the plaintiffs would have faced difficulties proving causation—the
IDF soldiers’ use of the bulldozers likely would have constituted an
intervening cause. Yet the court instead dismissed the case based on
the political question doctrine, refusing to rule on the propriety of
American aid to Israel in light of contemporary congressional and
207
executive policy.
Though some have argued that the court
208
improperly applied the doctrine in this case, it is difficult to see how
the court could have decided this case without making a judgment
209
about U.S. foreign policy. Had the court found Caterpillar liable, it
would have directly contradicted foreign policy and declared
210
American aid to Israel to be culpable conduct. Yet in other contexts
courts have seemed more receptive to litigation seeking to hold
211
corporations liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations.
The difference here, however, is the importance of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in U.S. foreign policy and the alliance between the United
212
States and Israel.
VI. LESSONS FROM THESE CASES
Having reviewed five categories of civil litigation related to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, this Part draws several lessons from an analysis
of these cases. First, the courts do not apply the political question
doctrine uniformly in these cases. Second, courts have been sensitive
to the politics involved in litigation surrounding the conflict and have

205. Id. at 982–84.
206. The Corries recently filed a civil suit against the Israeli Ministry of Defense in an Israeli
court. Rachel Corrie Relatives Sue Israel over Her Death, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/8558701.stm (last updated Mar. 10, 2010, 13:02 GMT).
207. Corrie II, 503 F.3d at 984.
208. See SKINNER, supra note 196, at 29 (“The plaintiffs do not challenge U.S. policy toward
Israel, nor do they seek a judgment on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rather, they seek
compensation for certain home demolitions and deaths that violated the law. The Political
Question Doctrine should not result in the dismissal of the case on these grounds.”).
209. See Corrie II, 503 F.3d at 982 (“[E]ach claim unavoidably rests on the singular premise
that Caterpillar should not have sold its bulldozers to the IDF.”).
210. Id. at 984. (“A court could not find in favor of the plaintiffs without implicitly
questioning, and even condemning, United States foreign policy toward Israel.”).
211. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 191 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal
of a suit against Pfizer for nonconsensual medical tests of an antibiotic on Nigerian children).
212. See supra notes 186, 203–06 and accompanying text.
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generally deferred to the judgment of at least one of the political
branches. Third, the high proportion of default judgments in these
cases results in important issues not being litigated. Finally, an
important caveat is in order. Given the prevalence of default
judgments and the lack of long-established precedent, these lessons
are tentative and subject to future revision as these cases continue to
work through the courts.
A. Courts Make Distinctions in Applying the Political
Question Doctrine
The cases examined in previous Parts demonstrate that U.S.
courts do not apply the political question doctrine uniformly to
refrain from involvement in all cases involving the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Despite the particularly contentious nature of the conflict,
when plaintiffs have sued under the ATA and the state sponsor of
terrorism exception to the FSIA, courts have refused to dismiss the
cases on political question grounds. The courts in cases such as Knox
and Flatow have construed suits against the PA, PLO, and Iran as
ordinary tort cases, placing them firmly in the realm of judicial
213
resolution. In suits against Iran, courts have found liability under
the state sponsor of terrorism exception despite executive branch
214
opposition to courts considering such cases.
Yet when no such explicit congressional authorization exists, the
courts have been more willing to dismiss lawsuits on political question
grounds. The Corrie court applied the political question doctrine,
declining to decide whether Caterpillar was liable for Rachel Corrie’s
215
death as a result of supplying U.S.-financed bulldozers to Israel.
Similarly, courts have refused to grant sovereign immunity to the PA,
ruling that decisions of recognition are political questions for the
216
executive branch. Thus, when specific authorization exists, the
courts have generally not heeded the views of Judge Bork or Judge
Robb that ruling on liability for international terrorism would
217
interfere with the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy. Nor
have the courts viewed cases related to the Arab-Israeli conflict as
entirely off-limits based solely on its contentious nature.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See supra Parts I.C and III.B.
Murphy, supra note 52, at 80–81.
See supra Part V.
E.g., Knox v. PLO (Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
See supra Part I.A.
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B. Courts Show Deference to at Least One of the Political Branches
The courts have not applied the political question doctrine in a
uniform fashion, and politics have played a role in decisions about
whether to invoke it. Indeed, the courts have admitted as much in
reiterating that the political question “doctrine is one of political
218
questions, not political cases.” The courts recognize that they are
being called upon to make sensitive judgments in cases fraught with
political concerns. In all of these cases, the courts have therefore
tread cautiously in interpreting statutes and in speculating about the
position of the executive branch.
The courts have frequently invited the executive branch to
participate in these cases by filing a statement of interest; the
executive branch, however, has only selectively become involved. It
has communicated its position that an Israeli leader should enjoy
219
immunity for his official acts, and it has opined that Caterpillar
220
should not be held liable for its sale of bulldozers to Israel. It has
221
also intervened to prevent the attachment of certain Iranian assets,
and it designates certain countries as state sponsors of terrorism. At
the same time, the executive branch did not intervene in suits against
the PA and PLO to argue that such suits were counter to U.S. policy.
Nor did it intervene to argue against the abrogation of Iran’s
sovereign immunity. In addition, both President Clinton and
President Bush signed into law statutes that plaintiffs have used to
sue terrorists and their supporters.
Political considerations underlie these decisions, and the courts
have largely deferred to the judgment of at least one of the political
branches in deciding whether to rule on these cases. Congress has
provided statutes under which the PA, PLO, Iran, and other alleged
supporters of terrorism can be sued; it has not done so in the case of
Israel, a U.S. ally. The courts have deferred to the policy judgment
implicit in these congressional actions. The judiciary has generally
deferred to the judgment of the executive branch as well, proceeding

218. See supra notes 43, 59 and accompanying text.
219. Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 2009).
220. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Corrie v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-36210).
221. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 1999)
(describing how the United States moved to quash attachment of Iranian diplomatic property);
Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (describing how the
United States moved to quash the attachment of an arbitral award).
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when a statute exists and the executive does not intercede and
dismissing cases when the opposite is true.
Yet the reality is more complex. The courts are caught in the
middle between a Congress pushing civil litigation against terrorism
222
and an executive branch reluctantly acquiescing in such suits. For
instance, the Departments of State and Justice opposed the State
Sponsor of Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA out of concern that it
would interfere with the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy
and make the United States an outlier among the international
223
community. Yet this opposition has generally not translated into
active involvement in suits against Iran, except to prevent the
attachment of certain Iranian assets. The criticisms of the executive
branch for its weakness on terrorism as a result of those interventions
demonstrate the potential political consequences of intervening to
urge dismissal of suits against Iran. Similarly, in Knox the United
States refrained from intervening on behalf of the PA. Again,
224
political considerations likely played a role. Thus, though the
executive branch’s circumspect involvement in these cases likely
stems from political considerations rather than from support for the
litigation, its lack of involvement in many of these cases has left the
courts to rely on Congress for direction.
C. Significant Issues in These Cases Have Not Been Litigated
Finally, it is significant that those cases that have proceeded to
judgment have usually been the result of defaults, obviating the need
225
for the plaintiffs to prove their cases in a contested forum. A default
judgment results in the plaintiffs’ evidence not being scrutinized as
carefully as it would be in a contested, fully litigated case. Since Iran,
the PA, and the PLO failed to contest the initial suits and thus had
222. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 127 (D.D.C.
2009) (“[T]his Court itself is . . . stuck in the middle and forced to referee these highly charged
and highly political disputes . . . in something of a political quagmire . . . .”).
223. Murphy, supra note 52, at 80–81.
224. See Kessler, supra note 69 (reporting that intervention could force a choice between
compensation for terrorist victims and support for the PA).
225. See Walter W. Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of
International Terrorism, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 35 (2002) (“[T]he federal district courts have
entered default judgments . . . often after evidentiary hearings that resemble non-jury trials,
albeit one-sided trials.”); John D. Shipman, Comment, Taking Terrorism to Court: A Legal
Examination of the New Front in the War on Terrorism, 86 N.C. L. REV. 526, 534 (2008) (“As a
result of these default judgments, many aspects of the AEDPA remain untested almost a
decade after it was enacted.”).
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default judgments entered against them, courts did not subsequently
need to deviate from the key findings of fact in those initial cases in
order to establish liability.
Despite the number of judgments awarded against the PA, PLO,
and Iran, the statutes under which the claims were brought have not
truly been tested. Proving causation in the context of support for
226
terrorism, as the court required in Boim, has proven to be a
significant challenge for plaintiffs. As the Knox II court noted,
defendants charged with material support may very well be able to
227
show that they were not responsible for the acts of terrorists. By
defaulting, however, the defendants in many cases have made the
results a foregone conclusion.
VII. EVALUATING THE DESIRABILITY AND EFFICACY OF
THIS LITIGATION
Aside from providing specific lessons, these cases also raise
questions about the desirability and efficacy of private civil litigation
against terrorism. Numerous commentators have defended these suits
228
as a useful tool in the fight against terrorism. Critics, however, have
described them as “inequitable, unpredictable, occasionally costly to
the U.S. taxpayer and damaging to the foreign policy and national
229
security goals of this country.” This final Part examines the impact
of these cases on civil litigation against terrorism in general. It does so
through the lens of seven arguments typically advanced for and
against such litigation: compensation, symbolic justice, deterrence,
impact on U.S. foreign policy, bias in U.S. foreign policy, the
prevalence of default judgments, scope of liability, and First
Amendment concerns. This Part concludes that, despite the mixed
results of these cases, such suits are nonetheless a desirable tool in the
fight against terrorism.

226. See supra Part II.
227. Knox v. PLO (Knox II), 248 F.R.D. 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
228. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 5 (“There is considerable reason to believe that the
civil justice system has substantial, underutilized potential in the war against terrorism.”);
Strauss, supra note 52, at 682 (“[T]he time has come for private citizens to enter the battle
[against terrorism] on civil grounds through lawsuits aimed at crippling terrorist organizations at
their foundation—their assets, funding, and financial backing.”).
229. Adam Liptak, U.S. Courts’ Role in Foreign Feuds Comes Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2003, at A1 (quoting William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
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A. Compensation
One strong argument in favor of these suits is their potential to
provide the victims of terrorism or their decedents with just
230
compensation. Courts have viewed these suits as ordinary tort
231
actions brought by one who has suffered harm. The plaintiffs in
these cases are thus deserving of compensation, but such
compensation is unlikely without access to the U.S. civil justice
232
system for several reasons. First, other countries have higher
jurisdictional thresholds and are more reluctant than the United
States to permit foreign nationals to bring such actions in their courts,
233
especially against foreign states. Second, given the international
community’s difficulty in achieving agreement on the definition of
234
terrorism, it is unlikely that international bodies would respond
235
favorably to these suits. Third, although the U.S. government
established a compensation fund for the victims of the September 11
attacks, no such fund is available to the victims of smaller terrorist

230. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 8 (“Compensation for victims of terrorism has been
woefully neglected.”).
231. Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991); Knox v. PLO
(Knox I), 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 248 F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
232. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 76–77 (noting the difficulty of suing terrorists abroad and
that “only the United States has claimed . . . the right to assert jurisdiction over states for
tortious acts they commit abroad”); Hamish Hume & Gordon Dwyer Todd, Ambulance
Chasing for Justice: How Private Lawsuits for Civil Damages Can Help Combat International
Terror, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Dec. 1, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.118/
pub_detail.asp (arguing that the United States “has become a world leader in providing a
judicial forum for private rights of action against foreign terror groups and the regimes that
support them”).
233. See Shipman, supra note 225, at 549 (“[S]ubjecting foreign defendants to the American
legal system based upon mere ‘minimum contacts’ is regarded by many in the international
community as an ‘exorbitant’ basis of federal jurisdiction.” (quoting Joseph W. Dellapenna,
Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 169, 211 (1999))).
234. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795–96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring); see also Murphy, supra note 52, at 50–55 (“[I]t is still debatable whether acts of
terrorism are crimes or torts that violate the law of nations or customary international law.”).
235. See Heiser, supra note 225, at 41 (“[T]he United States is not a signatory to any treaty
that would require another country to recognize and enforce our civil judgments.”); Ruth
Wedgwood, Civil Remedies and Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra
note 6, at 157, 179 (noting that there is no global treaty on international recognition or
execution of nonarbitral judgments). But see Moore, supra note 6, at 5 (“[T]errorist acts are not
gray area human activities, but rather are activities that are clearly viewed as criminal in every
legal system and are criminalized in the major U.N.-sponsored antiterrorism conventions
embodying community consensus against such acts.”).

SCHUPACK IN FINAL

2010]

9/8/2010 11:38:51 AM

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

239

236

attacks or their families. Finally, although the U.S. could espouse
the claims of U.S. citizen victims of terrorism, the government is
237
unlikely to employ this infrequently used tool of international law.
On the other hand, critics argue that these suits provide “hollow
238
239
rights” and false hope to plaintiffs who have little chance of
240
enforcing their judgments. Indeed, the number of uncompensated
241
plaintiffs undermines the compensation rationale for these suits.
Furthermore, even plaintiffs who have received some compensation,
242
such as Stephen Flatow, have been paid out of the U.S. Treasury.
The reality is that the parties found liable in these suits have
243
insufficient attachable assets to satisfy the judgments. For instance,
in seeking relief from judgment in Knox, the PA argued that it was
teetering on the brink of insolvency and could not afford to pay the
244
judgment or the bond against it. Similarly, Iranian assets in the
245
United States are insufficient to pay the judgments against Iran, and
the courts have sided with the executive branch in quashing attempts
to attach those assets. Congressional intervention in favor of Flatow
and other plaintiffs has enabled them to collect only a portion of their
246
judgments from the U.S. Treasury. Furthermore, this congressional

236. See John F. Murphy, Civil Litigation Against Terrorists and the Sponsors of Terrorism:
Problems and Prospects, 28 REV. LITIG. 315, 341 (2008) (noting that Senator Lugar proposed a
bill to create an alternative compensation scheme).
237. See Moore, supra note 6, at 8 (“[W]e have frequently neglected the victims of
international terrorism[, and] espousal of claims . . . seem[s] to have been largely forgotten.”).
238. Jonathan Fischbach, Note, The Empty Pot at the End of the Rainbow: Confronting
“Hollow-Rights Legislation” After Flatow, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1004 (2002).
239. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2009).
240. See, e.g., Baletsa, supra note 4, at 1251 (“[S]uch suits have resulted in unenforceable
judgments that deny the victims’ families the closure and accountability they desperately
need.”).
241. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith & Goodman, supra
note 127, at 146 (likening paying compensation out of the U.S. Treasury to “picking our own
pocket” (quoting Hitting Where it Hurts: The American Taxpayer May End Up Paying Osama
Bin Laden’s Legal Bills, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2001, at 57–58)).
243. See ELSEA, supra note 130, at 75 (showing the large discrepancy between the blocked
and non-blocked assets of terrorist states in the United States and the outstanding damages
owed by these states); Molora Vadnais, Comment, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Forward Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J. INT’L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 199, 214 (2000) (“[D]efendant states in terrorism exception cases tend to be
those that have limited assets in the U.S.”).
244. Weiser, supra note 70.
245. ELSEA, supra note 130, at 75.
246. Id. at 69–71.
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action has led to charges that better-connected plaintiffs are
247
compensated while others are left holding empty judgments.
The record is thus decidedly mixed. Some victims have collected
on judgments through settlement or congressional action, while
others have not collected and may never collect. These suits have at
times pitted the executive branch against victims of terrorism. Yet in
the absence of these suits, the plaintiffs would likely have no recourse
248
to seek compensation. Moreover, as in the case of Libya, it is
possible that the United States could attempt to settle such claims as
249
part of a normalization process. Given that the tort system is the
primary avenue available to U.S. citizens for achieving compensation
for intentional wrongdoing, cutting off these plaintiffs’ access would
leave them with no possible remedy.
B. Symbolic Justice and Historical Record
Though monetary compensation is important to many victims
and their families, an equally significant argument is that these suits
provide plaintiffs the opportunity to be heard and to seek justice
250
251
through the judicial process, which can help victims to heal.
Because it may be impossible to prosecute individual terrorists or
their organizations, a civil suit against a funder or state sponsor may
252
be these plaintiffs’ only opportunity to have their day in court.
Additionally, these suits provide a historical record of terrorist
253
attacks. Although many cases result in default judgments, the

247. Fischbach, supra note 238, at 1037.
248. See Murphy, supra note 236, at 316 (“[U]nlike criminal prosecutions, civil suits provide
at least the possibility that victims may be compensated . . . .”).
249. See Exec. Order No. 13,477, 3 C.F.R. 247 (2009) (announcing the settlement of private
American claims against Libya pursuant to a U.S.-Libyan agreement).
250. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 127, at 140–41 (“Even if plaintiffs cannot
enforce judgments obtained against terrorists, civil litigation still gives them the opportunity to
have a day in court to tell their story publicly and to persuade a judge or jury to officially
condemn the defendant’s acts.”).
251. See Shipman, supra note 225, at 569 (“While judgments rendered in American courts
may often be unenforceable, victims may nevertheless gain some closure by establishing
liability—a crucial part of the healing process.” (citing Seth Stratton, Taking Terrorists to Court:
A Practical Evaluation of Civil Suits Against Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 27, 53 (2004))).
252. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 315 (“[T]he prospects for holding the perpetrators of
international terrorism civilly liable for their actions are substantially greater than the prospects
for holding them criminally liable.”).
253. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 8 (arguing in favor of civil lawsuits against terrorism as
a means of “[t]elling the truth about terrorism”).
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requirement that plaintiffs present sufficient evidence for the court to
254
find in their favor establishes this record. If the case is litigated, as in
Boim, discovery provides plaintiffs access to important documents
and testimony regarding the defendants’ alleged support for
255
terrorism. Even in cases that are eventually dismissed, such as
Belhas, Doe, and Corrie, plaintiffs have the opportunity to present
evidence of the alleged wrongdoing and their injuries. Indeed, one
commentator has likened these suits to a “truth commission” for
256
terrorist attacks.
C. Deterrence
257

A third argument in favor of these suits is their deterrent value.
Securing a criminal conviction against an individual terrorist or
terrorist entity for acts committed outside the United States is
258
extremely difficult. Achieving accountability through the civil
system may be easier, however, due to the lower standard of proof
259
and the availability of discovery in civil litigation. Moreover, the
funders and supporters of terrorism are more likely to have
260
attachable assets than are the direct perpetrators. Courts may not
be well-equipped to take action against terrorists in the field, but they
are well-positioned to take action against financiers and their bank
261
accounts. These civil suits by “private attorneys general” may
262
supplement U.S. efforts to freeze terrorist assets. Indeed, private
civil suits “may be more palatable and politically feasible” to
263
government policymakers than criminal penalties, and such private
assistance may be desirable because the government cannot “pursue
all individuals and organizations connected by secondary

254. See supra Parts I.C, II, and III.B.
255. Murphy, supra note 52, at 315–16.
256. Wedgwood, supra note 235, at 170.
257. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 7 (“[I]f we can raise realistic expectations in the minds
of these terrorists that they and their organization will be held liable for substantial monetary
damages . . . wherever they may be, then we may be usefully adding to deterrence against
terrorism.”).
258. Shipman, supra note 225, at 570.
259. Murphy, supra note 52, at 315–16.
260. Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 127, at 144.
261. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the “incentive structure and operation” of private civil suits
may be better adapted to the “control of secondary conduct”).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 143.
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264

relationships.” Moreover, a developing international consensus
265
exists that the funding of terrorism should be actionable.
Proponents hope that by imposing a cost on the funding of terrorism,
these suits will deter individuals, organizations, and rogue states from
266
risking their assets to do so.
To critics of the deterrence rationale, plaintiffs’ inability to
267
enforce judgments against Iran undermines this reasoning.
Furthermore, measuring the impact of these cases is difficult, and
terrorism and terrorist financing in connection with the Arab-Israeli
conflict continues. The Boim case could have helped to discourage
terrorist financing in the United States, but that impact is likely small
in comparison with other U.S. antiterrorism measures.
The cases against the PA and PLO appear to have had a greater
268
impact. The PLO paid the Klinghoffers an undisclosed settlement,
and the PA has recently indicated its intention to contest suits against
it in U.S. courts, which creates the possibility of discovery and greater
269
transparency in PA affairs. Although the PA’s new strategy has yet
to be tested, a PA that participates in these suits may take more care
to ensure its assets and personnel are not funding terrorism.
Moreover, Congress has repeatedly acted to authorize and expand
270
plaintiffs’ ability to bring these cases. Although it is unlikely that
potential civil liability in U.S. courts will ever serve as a strong
deterrent to committed terrorists and their backers, it could help
deter less committed supporters and force potential funding
organizations to behave more responsibly or cease operations.
D. Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy
The suits against the PA, PLO, and Iran have generated a great
deal of controversy due to their potential to interfere with the
271
executive branch’s conduct of foreign affairs. Critics believe that

264. Id. at 143–44.
265. See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 235, at 168–69 (suggesting that the post–September 11
international regulatory scheme redefines “what it means to be culpable in a terrorist scheme”).
266. See, e.g., id. at 168 (“[I]nstitutions may be indulgent or even sympathetic to violent
actors, while supposing that the relationship . . . is too distant to carry consequence.”).
267. Fischbach, supra note 238, at 1025–26.
268. See supra Part I.A.
269. See supra Part I.C.
270. See supra Part III.A.
271. See Shipman, supra note 225, at 530 (describing U.S. courts as “the newest battleground
in a struggle between the executive branch and Congress”); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David
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these cases lead to court judgments that may be at odds with the
272
executive branch’s foreign policy. For instance, the executive
branch has expressed concern that utilizing Iran’s frozen assets to
satisfy judgments against that state eliminates a bargaining chip that
273
could be used in negotiations
and presents an obstacle to
274
normalization of relations. Along these lines, courts have imposed
large judgments against the PA—an entity that annually receives
275
millions of dollars in U.S. aid. These suits also lead to factfinding in
politically sensitive areas, such as the extent of PA support for
276
terrorism, and they could interfere with ongoing criminal or
277
intelligence investigations.
These judgments could also potentially interfere with U.S.
278
obligations under international law. No other country recognizes
such extensive jurisdictional claims for civil suits against sovereign
279
Indeed, the U.S. government intervened to prevent
nations.
attachment of Iranian diplomatic property largely because it feared
that otherwise it would be in violation of its obligations under the
280
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Property. The
United States was also concerned about retaliation for permitting
281
such suits. Indeed, Iran has passed a law authorizing its citizens to
282
sue the United States for “terrorism.”
Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102, 103 (arguing that
congressional encouragement of litigation against foreign governments in U.S. courts has
undermined U.S. diplomacy with countries such as Cuba and Iran).
272. Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 271, at 112.
273. Id. at 113–14.
274. Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 28 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1029, 1051 (2005); see also In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp.
2d 31, 38 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Today, at the start of a new presidential administration—one that has
sought engagement with Iran on a host of critical issues—it may be time for our political
leaders . . . to seek a fresh approach.”).
275. Christine M. Geier, Ungar v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 19 N.Y. INT’L L.
REV. 173, 178–79 (2006) (“[T]his conflict . . . creates the potential for embarrassment, when our
government recognizes the P.L.O. and the P.A. in their dealings with Israel, but not in conflicts
with our own country.”).
276. Wedgwood, supra note 235, at 173.
277. See Murphy, supra note 52, at 62 (noting that the Attorney General is authorized to
intervene to stay cases that may interfere with such an investigation).
278. Michael T. Kotlarczyk, Note, “The Provision of Material Support and Resources” and
Lawsuits Against State Sponsors of Terrorism, 96 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2045 (2008).
279. Id. at 2046.
280. Fischbach, supra note 238, at 1015.
281. Kotlarczyk, supra note 278, at 2047.
282. Id. at 2048.
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There are, however, numerous counterarguments. First, in the
ten years since Flatow was decided, there is little evidence that these
judgments have damaged U.S. foreign relations or constrained the
executive branch significantly. Regarding Iran, for example, these
cases have had a much smaller impact than the election of hardliner
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian nuclear program, or the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. In addition, the FSIA contains other exceptions to
sovereign immunity, such as for state commercial activity, and these
exceptions have not damaged U.S. international relations
283
significantly. Second, these judgments—which threaten a country’s
assets and potentially require future payments in the event of
normalization—may instead give the United States leverage by
providing a means of establishing liability and accountability for
284
terrorism when neither criminal nor international law apply. The
executive branch could also dangle the possibility of supporting
efforts to reopen judgments, as in Knox, or could seek negotiated
285
settlements of claims as part of normalization, as it did with Libya.
Third, concerns about possible retaliation against U.S. interests
286
stemming from these suits may be overstated.
Finally, the executive branch’s criticisms are best addressed to
Congress, not the courts. Courts are abiding by repeated
congressional authorization of these suits; they are not overstepping
287
their bounds. Congress views these suits as a useful tool in the fight
against terrorism and as a means of providing compensation to
288
victims. The executive branch has some ability to affect the

283. David MacKusick, Comment, Human Rights v. Sovereign Rights: The State Sponsored
Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 741,
772–73 (1996).
284. See Moore, supra note 6, at 17 (“Do we really want to send the message ‘kill and
torture Americans and we will simply ignore responsibility when the government changes?’”).
285. See supra notes 66–72, 249 and accompanying text. This would likely depend, however,
on whether plaintiffs agreed to waive certain vested rights to gain some compensation.
286. Moore, supra note 6, at 15 (arguing that “it is strongly in our interest to have every
nation on earth copy the 1996 FSIA amendments” and that it would be “bizarre to worry about
a few terrorist nations allegedly proceeding against U.S. assets in a setting where they are
perfectly willing to kill and torture Americans” (emphasis omitted)).
287. Hume & Todd, supra note 232 (“Congress expects U.S. courts to take an aggressive
stance towards terrorists, criminal regimes, genocidal warriors, and the entities and individuals
who provide their financial support.”).
288. Shipman, supra note 225, at 569 (“[E]nactment of terrorism-related
statutes . . . indicate[s] the unequivocal intent of Congress that victims of terrorism be allowed
to seek financial redress in U.S. courts.”).
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disposition of these suits, but it has not consistently done so. The
executive branch could have intervened in suits against the PA, as it
did to stop the attachment of Iranian assets, and it has discretion over
which countries it classifies as state sponsors of terrorism. The
executive also could have vetoed the congressional legislation
authorizing these cases, advocated new legislation limiting such suits,
or sought legislation implementing an alternative compensation
scheme. Instead, presidents have repeatedly acquiesced in Congress’s
actions in this context. Although the executive’s course may be the
result of sound political calculations, it is disingenuous for the
executive to criticize the courts for exercising a power that it
consented to give them.
E. Bias in U.S. Foreign Policy
Regardless of whether these suits interfere with U.S. foreign
policy, some critics have attacked these suits for incorporating an
290
alleged bias in U.S. foreign policy. Suits against the PA, PLO, and
291
Iran have resulted in large judgments, while courts have dismissed
292
suits against Israel, Israeli leaders, and Caterpillar. To these
commentators, this contrast represents an injustice that undermines
the legitimacy of such suits and the notion that litigants who are
victims of Israeli actions can rely upon U.S. courts to dispense
293
justice. When Israel or Israeli interests are at stake, the argument
goes, U.S. courts and political branches act to protect them.
If bias exists, however, it stems from the democratic process.
Congress has made judgments about how to define terrorism, what
conduct to punish, and whether to abrogate the sovereign immunity
of terrorist states. The executive has not extended recognition to the
PA as a sovereign state or intervened to attempt to prevent suits
289. See Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 675 F. Supp. 2d 104, 112 n.7
(D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the executive branch has been “unhelpful” in resolving the case, did
not file a statement of interest when asked by the court to do so, and instead filed a “mealymouthed Notice” that “provided no substantive guidance whatsoever”).
290. See, e.g., Keith Sealing, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” Is a Question, Not an Answer:
The Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 119, 134–41 (2003) (questioning why countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel
are not on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and thus are not subject to suit).
291. See supra Parts I.C and III.B.
292. See supra Parts IV–V.
293. See Sealing, supra note 290, at 143 (“Putting the matter in the hands of litigators and
haling foreign sovereigns into U.S. courts based on . . . politically motivated notions of whether
a given nation is a ‘State Sponsor of Terrorism’ or an ‘ally’ is not the solution.”).
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against it. Presidents have signed the legislation that abrogates the
294
sovereign immunity of state sponsors of terrorism like Iran. Critics
arguing that the courts are biased would more appropriately address
their complaints to the legislative and executive branches. The courts
simply base their rulings on the statutes approved by Congress and
signed by the president or on the executive branch’s foreign policy
decisions.
F. Prevalence of Default Judgments
A further criticism of these suits is that many of them result in
default judgments. Critics have questioned the imposition of such
large judgments based on defaults, in which the court reviews only the
295
plaintiff’s evidence. Many commentators believe that plaintiffs
would have a much harder time proving wrongdoing if these suits
296
were contested. Indeed, the Boim case demonstrates the difficulty
297
of establishing causation. The plaintiffs in Knox would have faced
298
similar challenges had they been required to litigate the case in full.
The defendants, however, chose to default in these cases, and it would
be counter to Congress’s intentions and to these suits’ compensatory
and deterrent purposes to place the burden of defendants’
nonappearance on the plaintiffs.
G. Scope of Liability and First Amendment Concerns
A final concern, specifically with regard to the ATA, is the
potential for liability to sweep too broadly and implicate First
Amendment rights. The arguments of the Boim dissenters
299
exemplifies this concern. It also played a role in the judge’s decision
300
to grant the PA and PLO relief from judgment in Knox II. Some
294. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 6, at 17 (discussing the compromise between Congress and
the Department of State that made blocked assets available to satisfy judgments).
295. See, e.g., Slaughter & Bosco, supra note 271, at 114 (“Often foreign states do not even
appear to defend themselves. In such an environment, the fairness of the proceedings becomes
questionable.”).
296. See, e.g., Vadnais, supra note 243, at 209 (“Evidence offered to prove issues such as
whether a particular state supports a particular group . . . may not hold up well under crossexamination. First, many sources of this type of evidence are classified or not easily subpoenaed.
Other sources . . . may not contain the specificity of information to withstand crossexamination.” (footnote omitted)).
297. See supra Part II.
298. See supra Part I.C.
299. See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
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commentators have noted that an expansive interpretation of the
ATA could result in “interference with religious expression, free
speech, and related association rights of persons indirectly connected
to terrorism,” as well as “with the good works of charitable
301
organizations.” Potential solutions include requiring the State
Department to authorize suits under the ATA or permitting the State
302
Department to intervene to prevent a suit under the ATA.
CONCLUSION
Despite the many problems with these lawsuits, U.S. courts have
proven capable of handling civil litigation related to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Labeling this litigation a failure would be premature.
Through these lawsuits, some victims have won compensation—albeit
through settlement and congressional action, rather than enforcement
of judgments. Further, these suits have likely provided at least some
measure of deterrence. The judgment in Boim will likely affect the
willingness of U.S.-based organizations to send money to groups like
Hamas, even if they believe that the money is going to ostensibly
charitable purposes. The Knox case and the failure of the executive
branch to shield the PA from liability will likely provide at least some
impetus for the PA to oversee its personnel more carefully, especially
with regard to their potential involvement in terrorist activities.
Flatow and other judgments against Iran have alerted that nation that
it will face accountability for its sponsorship of terrorism. Although
enforcing these judgments has proven difficult, these plaintiffs likely
could not have sought compensation through any other means.
Furthermore, courts have shown a willingness to defer to the
general direction provided by the political branches. To that end, the
courts have largely followed congressional statutes—signed into law
by the executive—in imposing liability. Courts have also deferred to
the executive branch when it has clearly stated that a given judgment
would interfere with U.S. foreign policy. When the executive branch
has refrained from active participation, however, the courts have
followed the direction of Congress. Overall, judicial involvement in
the Arab-Israeli conflict may have a mixed record of success, but it
has not been the unmitigated disaster critics feared.

301. Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 127, at 147.
302. Id. at 153.

